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Corporate Genealogists: The New Homicide Detectives
Morgan Crider*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 2018, the Sacramento Police Department (SPD) revealed
that they had used a commercial DNA database to identify a suspect whom
they believed to be the “Golden State Killer.”1 The SPD was able to identify
a familial match to the alleged killer by uploading DNA evidence obtained
from crime scenes to the genealogical website, GEDMatch.2 On GEDMatch,
the SPD was able to compare the genetic profile from the evidence with
profiles uploaded to the site by private users.3 From there, the SPD created a
family tree based on the ancestry of the genetic match and identified an indi-
vidual who fit the profile of the Golden State Killer.4 The SPD accessed the
genealogy website as a private user, never obtaining a warrant to access the
genetic information in an official law enforcement capacity.5
DNA has advanced to the point where law enforcement can now use
genealogical profiles to construct family trees and identify criminal suspects
based on their ancestry.6 Traditionally, the databases used by authorities have
been federal and state government originated, and subject to statutory regula-
tions with respect to DNA entry and use.7
This Note analyzes law enforcement’s use of commercial DNA
databases—designed for private genealogical or diagnostic research—for
criminal investigations.
* Morgan Crider is a 2020 candidate for Juris Doctor from SMU Dedman School
of Law. She received a Bachelor of Agricultural Communications and Journal-
ism from Texas A&M University in 2017.
1. See Thomas Fuller, How a Genealogy Site Led to the Front Door of the Golden
State Killer Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/26/us/golden-state-killer.html.
2. See Avi Selk, The Ingenious and ‘Dystopian’ DNA Technique Police Used to








7. See 34 U.S.C.A. § 40702 (West 2018).
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II. GOVERNMENT DNA COLLECTION AND
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
During the past twenty-four years, law enforcement has actively sought
to collect DNA from a large pool of individuals.8 Considering these efforts,
there has been both statutory and court guidance with respect to DNA collec-
tion and use.9 Courts have repeatedly implied that genetic information is ac-
tual property protected under the Fourth Amendment.10
A. The Evolution of Government DNA Collection.
The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) connects DNA laborato-
ries on the national, state, and local levels in a centralized software system.11
In 1994, Congress enacted the DNA Identification Act, which established the
National DNA Index System (NDIS).12 NDIS was created to stockpile DNA
profile records entered by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies
as part of CODIS.13 CODIS and NDIS are governed by statutory provisions
and are supervised by the FBI.14 The purpose of having a government-main-
tained DNA database is to allow “‘State and local forensics laboratories to
exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically in an attempt to link evi-
dence from crime scene for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of
convicted offenders on file in the system.’”15
The DNA collection begins with the Local DNA Index System (LDIS),
where local laboratories take samples and use them to generate CODIS
profiles.16 At the second level, the State DNA Index System (SDIS), state
law enforcement agencies input the LDIS information into their state-wide
8. See id. § 12592 (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132 (West 1994)).
9. See id. § 40702(a)(1)(B).
10. See United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446 (2013).
11. See Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF INVEST., https://




14. See id. (codified in 34 U.S.C.A. § 12592).
15. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 399 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting H.R. REP.
106-900(I) (2000)).
16. See Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated
World of State and Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639,
650 (2014); see also Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) Brochure, FED.
BUREAU OF INVEST. (2015), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/combined-dna-
index-system-codis-brochure.pdf/view.
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databases.17 Lastly, at NDIS, the highest level, state profiles are uploaded
into the national database but may be rejected if the FBI finds that the DNA
profile does not meet the NDIS standard requirements.18
CODIS DNA profiles focus on the analysis of chromosomes in the nu-
cleus of human cells, specifically, the DNA sequence unique to each human
genome known as short tandem repeats (STRs).19 The DNA profile will fo-
cus on alleles—the size and frequency of STRs along a strand of DNA—
because the combination of alleles are analyzed to identify a single person.20
As of August 2018, NDIS has 13,492,036 offender profiles, 3,246,832 arres-
tee profiles, and 879,945 forensic profiles.21
In contrast, familial DNA searches center on finding common alleles,
not an identical profile match.22 Closer genetic relationships, such as a parent
and child, are likely to have a substantial number of allele commonalities.23
Alternatively, distant genetic relationships result in fewer matching alleles
which weaken the genetic profile’s credibility.24 According to the FBI, famil-
ial searching should be conducted for the sole purpose of identifying close
biological relatives.25 Further, familial DNA searches must be limited to rela-
tives who are already in the DNA database.26
Familial DNA searches have frequently been met with criticism due to
their over-inclusive results, and law enforcement’s use of commercial genea-
logical databases have resulted in additional controversy.27 Currently, famil-
ial searches are not performed on the national level, and familial searches are
17. See Mercer & Gabel, supra note 16, at 669.
18. See id.; see also Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED. BU-
REAU OF INVEST., https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/
codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Aug. 26, 2019) (explaining that
states may create their own standards for DNA collection, but contributions to
NDIS must comply with federal provisions).
19. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 443 (2013).
20. See id.
21. See CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVEST. (Aug. 2018), https://
www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics.
22. See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle




25. See Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), supra note 11.
26. See id.
27. See Justin Poulsen, Your Relative’s DNA Could Turn You Into a Suspect,
WIRED (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/familial-dna-evi-
dence-turns-innocent-people-into-crime-suspects; see also Selk, supra, note 2.
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not conducted on NDIS.28 Some states, such as Maryland and the District of
Columbia, have statutorily prohibited the use of familial DNA testing, while
other states, such as Texas, require approval from a review board before a
familial search can be legally initiated.29 Only Arkansas, California, Colo-
rado, Florida, Michigan, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming
permit familial DNA testing for criminal investigations.30 There is considera-
ble legislative concern regarding state use of familial DNA searches.31 This
concern should logically bleed over into the use of commercial genealogical
databases by authorities to construct family trees. The FBI has distinguished
genealogical searches from familial searches because the pool of DNA sam-
ples is from individuals who have submitted their DNA to third-party compa-
nies.32 The key difference is that the DNA samples are not searched on
government generated and regulated databases but instead on private com-
mercial databases entitled to Fourth Amendment protections and free from
federal oversight.33
B. Do You Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy to Your DNA?
An individual’s DNA possesses unique information; however, the pro-
tection of that information from a warrantless intrusion is not absolute.34 “[A]
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”35 However, a
Fourth Amendment search does not occur when an individual has not mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the object of the search
and society is unwilling to recognize that expectation as reasonable.36 The
touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is the reasonableness of the “gov-
ernmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”37 Reasonableness
predominantly depends on the warrant clause, which requires authorities to
28. See Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), supra note 11.
29. See Allison Murray et al., Familial DNA Testing: Current Practices and Rec-
ommendations for Implementation, 9 INVESTIGATIVE SCI. J., Sept. 8, 2017, at 1,
3.
30. See Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), supra note 11.
31. See Michael B. Field et al., Study of Familial DNA Searching Policies and
Practices: Case Study Brief Series, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. (Aug.
2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251081.pdf.
32. See Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), supra note 11.
33. See id.
34. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013); see also 34 U.S.C.A.
§ 40702(a)(1)(B).
35. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
36. See id.
37. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
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show probable cause to “a neutral magistrate” and persuade the magistrate to
provide authorization to carry out a search by issuing authorities a warrant.38
In some narrow circumstances, law enforcement may execute a search with-
out a warrant so long as the search is reasonable, such as in searches con-
ducted after a lawful arrest.39
In 2000, Congress authorized the DNA Act, which requires the collec-
tion of DNA samples from any individual “in the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying federal offense.”40
Further, the DNA Act allows the collection of DNA samples “from individu-
als who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted from non-United States
persons who are detained under the authority of the United States.”41
The United States Supreme Court held in Maryland v. King that the
police can reasonably collect a buccal DNA swab from an individual taken
into police custody without a warrant because detainees have a diminished
expectation of privacy.42 The Supreme Court noted that traditionally, some
indication of “individualized suspicion” as justification for a constitutional
search or seizure was preferred, “[b]ut the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion.”43 With respect to constitutional
protection from search and seizure, the question is one of reasonableness.44
Courts must consider the special needs of law enforcement and weigh those
interests against an individual’s right to a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.45 In its holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that an individual taken
into police custody has a diminished expectation of privacy compared to a
citizen who has not been suspected of wrongdoing.46 By distinguishing indi-
viduals in police custody from those who are not, the Supreme Court implies
that the police must obtain a warrant to collect DNA from individuals whom
the police do not possess sufficient suspicion to arrest.
III. COMMERCIAL GENEALOGY TURNED
INVESTIGATIVE TOOL
The Supreme Court posed the notion that the necessity of a warrant is at
its minimum when the search “involves no discretion that could properly be
38. See id. at 822 (citing United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich., S.
Div., 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972)).
39. See id.
40. 34 U.S.C.A. § 40702(a)(1)(B).
41. See id. § 40702(a)(1)(A).
42. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 447 (2013).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 447, 461.
46. See id. at 463–464.
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limited” by the actions of a neutral third-party between the citizen whose
DNA is being collected and law enforcement;47 “it would be foolish to con-
tend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment
has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”48 Law enforce-
ment takes this concept to heart by accessing a commercial genealogical
database, “a neutral third-party,” as a private user to identify the DNA sam-
ple needed in an investigation.49
Genealogy companies such as Ancestry.com and 23andMe, in their
terms of service, explain that the genetic information sent to them is in some
form preserved by the company.50 GEDMatch’s user policies state:
We may disclose your Raw Data, personal information, and/or
Genealogy Data if it is necessary to comply with a legal obligation
such as a subpoena or warrant. We will attempt to alert you to this
disclosure of your Raw Data, personal information, and/or Gene-
alogy Data, unless notification is prohibited under law.51
This use and preservation of genetic information, whether in the form of
property rights or licensing agreements, classifies the information as being
within the possession of the genealogy companies, which warrants Fourth
Amendment protection.52
In the case of the Golden State Killer, the SPD did not obtain a warrant
when it accessed the commercial genealogy site as a private user.53 During its
investigation, the SPD utilized GEDMatch’s resources to identify suspects.54
This access to voluntarily submitted DNA is distinguishable from an arrestee,
or pretrial detainee, being required to provide DNA by law enforcement, as
permitted under 34 U.S.C.A. § 40702, because police are accessing this in-
formation without a warrant and § 40702 neither expressly nor implicitly
permits the collection of DNA from a commercial corporation’s resources
without a warrant.55
47. See id. at 447.
48. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that sensitive infor-
mation gathered through an unprecedented use of technology constituted a
“search” which required a warrant).
49. See Selk, supra note 2.
50. See Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRY.COM (June 5, 2018), https://
www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions; see also Terms of Service,
23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
51. See GEDMatch.com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH (May
20, 2018), https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm.
52. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
53. See Selk, supra note 2.
54. See id.
55. See 34 U.S.C.A. § 40702 (West 2018).
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In contrast, this kind of access is analogous to the government unlaw-
fully seizing assets from a business because, as stated in United States v.
Kriesel, genetic information such as blood may be considered property.56
Law enforcement is still required to follow the guidelines of the Fourth
Amendment with respect to the seizure of such company assets, even if the
assets consist of genetic information, until there is a statutory provision stat-
ing otherwise.57 Moreover, in instances where companies, such as
GEDMatch, will only share its resources with law enforcement under a legal
obligation stemming from a subpoena or warrant, the authorities’ presenta-
tion of itself as a consumer could be considered fraudulent.58
Similarly, Apple has fought the government with respect to law enforce-
ment’s use of the company’s technology in criminal investigations, even with
the presence of a warrant, because of the severe implications of iPhone users’
diminished expectation of privacy.59 Further, fourteen major technology
companies, including Google and Verizon, signed onto an amicus brief sub-
mitted to the Supreme Court in response to the privacy issues raised in
United States v. Carpenter.60 The brief asserted that the users of the amici’s
technological services do not necessarily expect their information, shared
through their normal use of the services, to be available to law enforcement
without a warrant.61 There is still a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to information that becomes a commercial company’s property.62
“When law-enforcement agencies seek user data pursuant to a warrant . . .
[the technology companies] work to ensure that investigative needs are met
56. United States v. Kriesel, 720 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013)
57. See Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392.
58. However, this is considered unlikely given that this use is similar to law en-
forcement creating fake Facebook profiles to target suspects, a practice courts
have upheld. See Christina Sterbenz, Cops are Creating Totally Bogus
Facebook Profiles Just so they Can Arrest People, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 21,
2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/police-make-fake-facebook-profiles-
to-arrest-people-2013-10; see also Sari Horwitz, Justice Dept. Will Review




59. See In re Apple Motion to Vacate, at 1, Matter of Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Califor-
nia License Plate 35KGD203, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (N.D. Cal.) (filed and settled outside of court).
60. Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 1–9, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16–402).
61. See id. at 18–20.
62. See Silverthorne Lumber, 251 U.S. at 392.
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without subjecting users to undue intrusion.”63 These private companies em-
phasize that the presence of a warrant, and an opportunity to contest the
seizure of such information, is key, as opposed to baseless searches with no
reasonable limitations.64 The technology companies “agree that Fourth
Amendment doctrine should recognize that, in the evolving digital era, where
such data is disclosed . . . people reasonably expect that their data will be
stored securely and remain private.”65 There is a “societal understanding that
certain areas,” such as the digital realm, “deserve the most scrupulous protec-
tion from government invasion.”66
The United States Supreme Court affirmed these companies’ notion that
the information they acquire through customers’ use of their services warrant
protection in the case of Carpenter v. United States.67 Law enforcement’s
access to locational information collected by wireless carriers was found to
require a warrant, which would limit the scope of a search.68 The Supreme
Court stated that while the standard for searches may be reasonableness, case
law has established that warrantless searches are typically unreasonable
where “a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evi-
dence of criminal wrongdoing.”69 A warrant is required where an individual
has a “legitimate privacy interest” in information managed by third-party en-
tities.70 The government’s ability to access information that is normally
guarded has progressed with technology, and the Supreme Court “has sought
to ‘assure the preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’”71
The notion of corporate asset protection is contended to be worthy of an
even higher standard, as Apple argued with respect to its customers’ iPhone
privacy.72 In the case of the San Bernardino, California mass shooting, the
FBI filed suit to compel Apple to unlock an encrypted iPhone used by one of
the two attackers after Apple adamantly opposed disclosing the information
63. See Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 20, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16–402).
64. See id. at 11, 21.
65. See id. at 1.
66. See id. at 22 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
67. See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210–11 (2018).
68. See id. at 2210–11 (2018).
69. See id. at 2221.
70. See id. at 2222.
71. See id. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
72. See Apple Inc’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assis-
tance at 2, Matter of Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During Execution of a
Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203,
2016 WL 618401 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. ED 15–0451M).
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as an invasion of the iPhone user’s reasonable expectation of privacy by cre-
ating a security vulnerability in iPhones.73 After a United States District
Court in California ordered Apple to unlock the encrypted iPhone, Apple’s
counsel filed a petition to vacate the order, asserting that “[c]ompelling Ap-
ple to create software [to unlock an individual iPhone] will set a dangerous
precedent for conscripting Apple and other technology companies to develop
technology to do the government’s bidding in untold future criminal investi-
gations.”74 These sentiments are echoed in the Carpenter amicus brief, em-
phasizing the sensitivity of the data entrusted to them, which requires that
companies who use information to provide services must work to protect
customer information and take “substantial measures to honor and reinforce
their customers’ expectation of privacy.”75
Ancestry.com (Ancestry) publishes an annual transparency report, ac-
cessible to its users (members), which covers law enforcement requests for
member information.76 Ancestry requires valid legal process in order to pro-
duce information about its members, and it only complies with legitimate
requests, such as subpoenas and warrants.77 When Ancestry receives a legal
request for information concerning its members, Ancestry officials review
the request to ensure it satisfies legal requirements and will attempt to narrow
the disclosure if Ancestry believes the request is overly broad.78 There is a
clear threat with respect to an unlimited access to commercial genealogy
databases, and Ancestry has acted preemptively to counter that threat.
As biometrics become a prominent aspect for private businesses, author-
ities are more likely to lean on these companies for access to their unwitting
consumers’ genetic information. Police have become consumers rather than
producers of surveillance.
IV. TESTING QUALITY VERSUS QUANTITY
Commercial genealogical databases are not held to the same standard as
government-regulated DNA databases and are therefore more susceptible
egregious errors.79 During the SPD’s investigation into the Golden State
73. See id. at 7.
74. See id. at 25.
75. See Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 20, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16–402).
76. See Your Privacy, ANCESTRY.COM (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.ancestry.com/
cs/legal/privacystatement.
77. See Ancestry 2018 Transparency Report, ANCESTRY.COM (2018), https://www
.ancestry.com/cs/transparency.
78. See Ancestry Guide for Law Enforcement, ANCESTRY.COM, https://www.ances-
try.com/cs/legal/lawenforcement (last visited Aug. 8, 2019).
79. See Regulation of Genetic Tests, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST. (Jan. 17,
2018), https://www.genome.gov/10002335/regulation-of-genetic-tests; see also
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Killer, the department initially misidentified a man from Oregon as the sus-
pect because of a similar but tenuous genetic connection to the SPD’s recon-
structed family tree taken from GEDMatch.80
Similarly, in 2015, law enforcement in Idaho relied on a potential famil-
ial genetic match from a commercial genealogy company, leading to the mis-
identification of man in a murder investigation.81 Michael Usry became a
suspect in the 1996 murder investigation of a woman from Idaho Falls.82 He
had been identified as one of three potential suspects after law enforcement
ran a familial search through a genetic database from Ancestry.com.83 The
police had received a court order to compel Ancestry.com to give the detec-
tives access to its DNA database, some of which the company obtained from
a genealogy project conducted by a Mormon Church that Usry’s father had
participated in.84
For a local laboratory to contribute to CODIS, “the lab must sign a
memorandum of understanding agreeing to adhere to the quality standards
and submit to audits to evaluate compliance with federal standards for scien-
tifically rigorous DNA testing.”85 In general, laboratories seeking to partici-
pate in NDIS need to be accredited in DNA by a nonprofit professional
association involved in and nationally recognized by the forensic science
community.86
Commercial genealogy and genetic businesses such as 23andMe offer to
test DNA samples and provide individualized reports on genetic conditions,
ranging from those genes associated with serious health disorders to those
associated with hair loss and food preferences.87 Unlike government-based
DNA databases, commercial genealogical businesses do not face the same
NDIS Operational Procedures Manual, FED. BUREAU OF INVEST. (2018),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ndis-operational-procedures-manual.pdf/
view.
80. See Selk, supra note 2.
81. See Poulsen, supra note 27; see also Jim Mustian, New Orleans Filmmaker
Cleared in Cold-Case Murder; False Positive Highlights Limitations of Famil-
ial DNA Searching, NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.thead
vocate.com/new_orleans/news/article_1b3a3f96-d574-59e0-9c6a-c3c7c0d2f1
66.html.
82. See Poulsen, supra note 27.
83. See Mustian, supra note 81.
84. See Poulsen, supra note 27.
85. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 445 (2013).
86. See NDIS Operational Procedures Manual, supra note 79, § 2.1.
87. See Erin Murphy, DNA in the Criminal Justice System: A Congressional Re-
search Service Report* (*from the Future), 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 340, 344
(2016).
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level of regulation with respect to their DNA testing.88 The most common
test kits are “laboratory-developed tests” (LDTs), where the test is created
and tested by a single laboratory and where genetic samples are to be sent.89
Genealogical and genetic companies are only under the regulatory “enforce-
ment discretion” of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in terms
of commercial DNA testing.90 Enforcement discretion means that the FDA
has the authority to regulate the test, but it chooses not to.91 Therefore, LDTs
are used without the FDA’s certification with respect to the test’s analytical
and clinical validity.92
Further, ancestry test results are not necessarily consistent across differ-
ent providers.93 Commercial genealogy companies may come to different
conclusions with respect to the percentage of ancestry from a particular re-
gion, because the results are largely dependent on the quality of the samples
and the diversity of the genetic pool to which the samples are being com-
pared.94 DNA ancestry companies use reference databases to infer an individ-
ual’s ancestry, and each company has its own database to determine ancestry
according to geographical location, called Ancestry Informative Markers
(AIMs).95 AIMs are developed from databases of Single Nucleotide
Polymorphisms (SNPs), and the ancestry results depend on the number of
AIMs used.96 Because each company has its own AIM, the results for ances-
try are not necessarily the same.97
In 2017, the FDA released a discussion paper with suggested guidelines
for the regulation of commercial genealogy companies because of the in-
creased demand for direct-to-consumer genomic testing and advances in
next-generation sequencing technology, which, without regulation, would





93. See Kira Peikoff, I Had My DNA Picture Taken, With Varying Results, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/31/science/i-had-
my-dna-picture-taken-with-varying-results.html?_r=0 (explaining that genetic
testing companies read segments of DNA to identify traits, diseases, etc., and
different companies may read different segments of the same DNA sample).
94. See Sheldon Krimsky & David Cay Johnston, Ancestry DNA Testing and Pri-
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pose a public health threat.98 However, the discussion paper was simply the
FDA’s current thoughts on the topic, so it is not legally binding. In the dis-
cussion paper, the FDA stated that it would not issue final guidance on over-
sight for LDTs until there had been further public discussion and legislative
guidance on the subject.99
Law enforcement is using a resource originally created for profit that
was not required to meet the same regulatory standard as the CODIS.100 The
federal statutory provisions governing CODIS are there to ensure that no
private citizen is wrongfully deprived of his or her freedom. Allowing poten-
tially low-quality evidence to be searched in unregulated databases casts a
wide net of suspicion over a vast amount of people. In a situation such as the
Golden State Killer investigation, there is a degradation of standards in DNA
testing and unfettered government access to a commercial corporation’s re-
sources disguised as a private consumer search.101
V. REINFORCING PRIVACY AND RAISING THE STANDARD
If the use of commercial genealogical databases is to be commonplace,
there must be explicit legislation to permit law enforcement to act without a
warrant in using commercial resources for DNA collection. DNA possesses a
plethora of information as unique to individuals as locational information,
which was deemed worthy of a warrant in Carpenter v. United States.102
Additionally, considering the vast number of people within these commercial
databases and the tenuous science of familial searches, there needs to be a
clearly defined scope to these searches.
Further, if these corporate assets are to be used in the most serious of
investigations, then the DNA testing from these commercial laboratories
should be held to a higher standard that is more akin to that of a lab worthy
of NDIS admission. Absent this level of scrutiny, and without proper regula-
tion of DNA testing used by law enforcement, such reliance on questionable
resources could result in a back-step in the use of DNA evidence.
98. See id.
99. See Regulation of Genetic Tests, supra note 79; see also Discussion Paper on
Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 13,
2017), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalpro
cedures/invitrodiagnostics/laboratorydevelopedtests/ucm536965.pdf.
100. See Selk, supra note 2; see also Regulation of Genetic Tests, supra note 79.
101. See Fuller, supra note 1.
102. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210 (2018).
